Permission Escalation Claims

Exploits the model's inability to verify identity or authorization claims. The model has no authentication layer — it cannot check whether "Level 5 clearance" or "IRB approval #20245847" are real. Safety training teaches the model to refuse regardless of claimed permissions, but the conflict between "be helpful to authorized users" and "refuse harmful requests" creates an exploitable decision boundary.

• Pattern match for authorization claims: "clearance," "security code," "API key," "IRB approval," "override code," "authorized," "unrestricted access"
• Flag classification markings in user input (TS//SCI, NOFORN, etc.)
• Flag claims of internal team membership ("I'm from the safety team," "Anthropic/OpenAI authorized")

Chains to T1-AT-014 (Authority Spoofing) — permission claims combine with impersonation of specific organizations. In agentic contexts (T11), permission escalation chains to ASI03 (Identity & Privilege Abuse) when the agent's tool permissions are governed by the conversation context.